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I. INTRODUCTION
In a watershed empirical study conducted in 2007, law professors Dan
Kahan, David Hoffman, and Donald Braman set out to determine what
effect, if any, culturally motivated cognition had on individuals’
interpretations of legally consequential facts.1 Culturally motivated
cognition is “the ubiquitous tendency of people to form perceptions, and
to process factual information generally, in a manner congenial to their
values and desires.”2
Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman decided to test their thesis based on a
challenge Justice Scalia issued as part of his majority opinion in Scott v.
Harris.3 In Scott, police officers conducted a high speed chase of a
suspect’s car through busy roads with other cars and pedestrians present.4
The chase ended with one of the police cars intentionally bumping the
suspect’s car, causing it to roll over at high speed and rendering the suspect
a quadriplegic.5 The suspect sued the police department under federal
civil rights law, alleging that the use of deadly force to terminate the
chase constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution.6
The entire car chase was captured on police car video cameras, and the
video was submitted as evidence on behalf of the police to establish that
their conduct was reasonable under the circumstances.7 Agreeing with
the police, Justice Scalia for the 8-1 majority found that, with the video
as the primary evidence, the only possible conclusion was that the police
acted in a reasonable manner.8 In a footnote, Justice Scalia further stated:
“We are happy to allow the videotape to speak for itself.”9 Justice
Stevens, the lone dissenter, pointedly disagreed and concluded based on
the same video that he did not necessarily believe that the police acted in
a reasonable manner in attempting to apprehend the suspect.10

1. Dan M. Kahan et. al., Whose Eyes Are You Going To Believe? Scott v. Harris
and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 838 (2009).
2. Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the
Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 3).
3. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378–81 (2007); Kahan et al., supra note 1, at 838.
4. 550 U.S. at 375.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 375–76.
7. Id. at 378. The Scott video is available on the Court’s website. Video Resources,
SUP. CT. U.S. (Apr. 30, 2007), http://www.supremecourt.gov/media/media.aspx.
8. Scott, 550 U.S. at 378–80.
9. Id. at 378 n.5.
10. Id. at 390 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Rather than supporting the conclusion that
what we see on the video ‘resembles a Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening
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In their study, Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman showed the Scott video
to a diverse demographic sample of 1,350 Americans.11 Although most
of the respondents agreed with Justice Scalia’s interpretation of the
video tape,12 a surprising number of individuals, particularly those from
defined cultural subcommunities, agreed with Justice Stevens’s dissent
that the video did not necessarily speak for itself.13
Based on their study’s findings, Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman argued
that Justice Scalia’s opinion for the majority in Scott constituted a “type
of decisionmaking hubris that has cognitive origins and that has
deleterious consequences that extend far beyond the Court’s decision in
Scott.”14 They concluded that “judges’ own perceptions of fact can
sometimes furnish them with unreliable guidance on what ‘reasonable’
but culturally diverse people are likely to perceive.”15
Moreover, and importantly, they contended that Justice Scalia’s
interpretative method “incurred [a] cost to democratic legitimacy associated
with labeling the perspective of persons who share a particular cultural
identity ‘unreasonable’ and hence unworthy of consideration in the
adjudicatory process.”16 This is what they referred to as “cognitive
illiberalism.” To counteract cognitive illiberalism, Kahan, Hoffman, and
Braman suggested that courts could divest the law of culturally partisan
overtones that detract from the law’s legitimacy through various forms
of debiasing education and techniques.17
In a recent paper, Cultural Cognition at Work,18 I explored whether
this same “decisionmaking hubris” with “cognitive origins” existed in
other legal contexts, such as in labor and employment law decisions.19
To my surprise, and counter to my initial intuition, culturally motivated

sort,’ the tape actually confirms, rather than contradicts, the lower courts’ appraisal of the
factual questions at issue.” (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)).
11. Kahan et al., supra note 1, at 841.
12. Id. at 879.
13. Id. at 841.
14. Id. at 842.
15. Kahan et al., supra note 2 (manuscript at 33).
16. Kahan et al., supra note 1, at 842.
17. See id. at 843 (“Judges, legislators, and ordinary citizens should therefore always be
alert to the influence of this species of ‘cognitive illiberalism’ and take the precautions
necessary to minimize it.”).
18. Paul M. Secunda, Cultural Cognition at Work, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 107 (2010).
19. Id. at 111, 121 (quoting Kahan, supra note 1, at 842).
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cognition, or “cultural cognition,”20 did appear to provide a robust
explanation for how Justices’ values in these cases could potentially lead
to different perceptions of legally consequential facts in labor and
employment law cases.21 Cultural Cognition at Work therefore concluded
by considering opinion-writing debiasing techniques for ridding legal
decisions of delegitimizing bias in order to make these decisions more
acceptable to a larger segment of society.22
Yet, little attention has been paid in the academic literature to
institutional structures as a vehicle for judicial debiasing. This Article
therefore investigates institutional debiasing strategies that may work to
further minimize conflict in society over labor and employment law
decisions. In this vein, Part II seeks to distill the essentials of culturally
motivated cognition and how it relates to, yet differs from, other earlier
studies on the role that values and assumptions play in labor and
employment law cases. Part III then comprehensively explores a spectrum
of debiasing strategies for legal decisionmakers, from opinion-writing
debiasing strategies to institutional strategies involving specialized
courts and judges. Finally, Part IV considers the arguments in favor of
specialized judicial institutions, the arguments against such institutions,
and finally, the promise of opacity in the judicial selection process.
The Article concludes by maintaining that the American legal system
should at least experiment with institutional debiasing strategies to
counteract culturally motivated cognition and the problems associated
with cognitive illiberalism. Such an approach will (1) minimize the amount
of needless discontent over American labor and employment law,
(2) promote greater uniformity and predictability in these legal decisions,
and (3) encourage the development of a professionalized group of labor
and employment judges. These expert judges will thereafter have the
means to uphold their commitment to the liberal ideal of deciding these
cases in a neutral manner.23

20. Id. at 148; see also Kahan et al., supra note 2 (manuscript at 1) (“Cultural
cognition refers to the unconscious influence of individuals’ group commitments on their
perceptions of legally consequential facts.”).
21. Secunda, supra note 18, at 139–40.
22. Id. at 140–48.
23. See Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court, 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral
Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 6 (2011) (“The most fundamental form of individual freedom that liberal
constitutionalism secures for its citizens depends on the promise that government won’t
impose legal obligations that presuppose adherence to a moral or political orthodoxy.”).
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II. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
The context for this Article is the phenomenon of culturally motivated
cognition, or cultural cognition, and its influence on and danger to
neutral decisionmaking by legal decisionmakers. This Part initially sets
out the theoretical background by discussing the first generation of scholarly
insight into the psychology behind judicial decisions. Thereafter, Part
II.B discusses the next generation of insight-cultural cognition, which
considers the mechanism by which this psychological phenomenon
operates.
A. The First Generation of Legal Realist Insight
As legal scholars from generations past aptly observed, facts matter
very much in labor and employment law cases. For instance, in Values
and Assumptions in American Labor Law, James Atleson noted that
“[l]egal criticism constantly expose[d] the failure of adjudicators either
to justify coherently the decisions reached or to rationally place the
decisions within the received wisdom.”24 Atleson maintained that such
decisions were due to more than just faulty analysis or judicial whimsy.25
Atleson provocatively argued that “many judicial and administrative
decisions are based upon other, often unarticulated, values and assumptions
that are not to be found or inferred from the language of the statute or its
legislative history.”26 Instead, he continued, “[t]he presence of such values
and assumptions, often only implicit or hinted at, helps explain many
decisions which otherwise seem odd, irrational, or at least inconsistent
with the received wisdom.”27 In other words, management and labor are
fighting a cultural war of values, and legal decisionmakers often seem
oblivious of their own motives when choosing one cultural value over
another.28
Other scholars made similar arguments.29 For instance, Gary Minda in
his book, Boycott in America, discussed how the “cognitive effects of
24. JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 2 (1983).
25. Id.
26. Id.; see also id. at 10 (“The basic theme of the book . . . is that assumptions and
values about the economic system and the prerogatives of capital, and corollary assumptions
about the rights and obligations of employees, underlie many labor law decisions.”).
27. Id. at 10.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., GARY MINDA, BOYCOTT IN AMERICA: HOW IMAGINATION AND IDEOLOGY
SHAPE THE LEGAL MIND (1999); Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner
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legal imagination have remained concealed within law’s official forms
of reason.”30 He maintained that, “[l]ike a chameleon, the law is capable
of changing the meaning it attributes to phenomena depending on the
context and the ideological motivations of law’s official interpreters.”31
Ideology, in Minda’s sense, is not the vulgar ideology of the political,32
but rather “refer[s] to the way cognitive thought conceals information
about phenomena, especially the interests and values that may be
implicated.”33
Of course, Minda and Atleson were inspired by the realist critique of
legal formalism from the early part of the twentieth century.34 Consider
the views of Jerome Frank, a well-known legal realist from that time
period, on the legal perception of facts in this regard:
The fact is, and every lawyer knows it, that those judges who are most lawless,
or most swayed by the “perverting influences of their emotional natures,” or
most dishonest, are often the very judges who use most meticulously the language of
compelling mechanical logic, who elaborately wrap about themselves the pretense
of merely discovering and carrying out existing rules, who sedulously avoid any
indications that they individualize cases.35

Or those of Benjamin Cardozo, later a United States Supreme Court
Justice:
I have spoken of the forces of which judges avowedly avail to shape the form
and content of their judgments. Even these forces are seldom fully in
consciousness. . . . But the subject is not exhausted with the recognition of their
power. Deep below consciousness are other forces, the likes and the dislikes,
the predilections and the prejudices, the complex of instincts and emotions and
habits and convictions, which make the man, whether he be litigant or judge.36

Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937–1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265,
265 (1978) (“Law always expresses a vision of society. It also expresses the groups
behind this vision and the interests served by conceiving the society in that particular
form.” (quoting José Antonio Viera-Gallo, The Legal System and Socialism, 1972 WIS.
L. REV. 754, 755)).
30. MINDA, supra note 29, at xi.
31. Id. at xii.
32. See Secunda, supra note 18, at 110 n.12 (discussing one way judges’ values
impact their decisions as when they choose “the outcome that best promotes their
political preferences without regard for the law” (quoting Dan M. Kahan, “Ideology In”
or “Cultural Cognition of” Judging: What Differences Does It Make?, 92 MARQ. L.
REV. 413, 415 (2009))).
33. MINDA, supra note 29, at xiii.
34. See, e.g., K.N. Llewellyn, The Rule of Law in Our Case-Law of Contract, 47
YALE L.J. 1243, 1243–44 (1938) (demonstrating one example of a realist critique of
legal formalism).
35. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 148 (Anchor Books 1963) (1930).
36. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 167 (1921);
see also O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 734 n.3 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(“It seems to me that whenever . . . courts fail to concentrate on the facts of the case,
these predilections inevitably surface, no longer held in check by the ‘discipline’ of the
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Finally, consider Felix Frankfurter, also later a Supreme Court Justice,
who maintained: “It is plain . . . that judges are not merely expert reporters
of pre-existing law. Because of the free play of judgment allowed by the
Constitution, judges inevitably fashion law.”37
Atleson and Minda continued Frank, Cardozo, and Frankfurter’s realist
critique of how legal decisionmakers’ values and assumptions can have a
dispositive impact on how important legal issues are decided, and continued
this critique particularly in the labor and employment law context.38
B. The New Generation of Legal Realist Insight
But cultural cognition insights differ. They are not just another theory
that recycles the basic thesis that values held by judges drive judicial
decisions. Although past generations of legal scholars did eloquently
and thoroughly discuss how legal decisionmakers’ values impacted labor
and employment law cases, they did not describe the mechanism or process
by which judges’ assumptions and values came to shape facts in labor
and employment cases. This distinction is crucial because to counteract
the influence of such values and assumptions, a psychological explanatory
device for this phenomenon is required.39
Culturally motivated cognition is a theory that maintains that legal
decisionmakers in many cases are not self-conscious partisans.40 Rather,
most of the time, they seek to arrive at the right decision without being
ideologically committed to any prior legal or political view.41 Nevertheless,
disagreements over legally consequential facts are especially prevalent

facts, and shape, more than they ever should and even to an extent unknown to judges
themselves, any legal standard that is then articulated.”).
37. FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 8 (1938).
38. More recently, other scholars have developed various forms of what has been
called the “new legal realism.” See, e.g., Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties
of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95
CORNELL L. REV. 61, 61 (2009) (surveying the scholarship and arguing that “‘new legal
realism’ is a response to a ‘new formalism’—that derived from neoclassical law and
economics.”); see also Stewart Macaulay, The New Versus the Old Legal Realism:
“Things Ain’t What They Used To Be,” 2005 WIS. L. REV. 365; Thomas J. Miles & Cass
R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2008).
39. Judge Frank recognized as much when he maintained that “[o]ur law schools
must become, in part, schools of psychology applied to law in all its phases.” FRANK,
supra note 35, at 156.
40. Secunda, supra note 18, at 139.
41. Id. at 110.
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in labor and employment law cases.42 In this highly polarized field, legal
decisionmakers naturally align themselves, based on their worldviews, with
employer or employee interests.
For instance, current administrative law practice prescribes how many
Democrats and Republicans sit on the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB or Board) during any given period.43 This state of affairs is not
because most Board members are incapable of putting aside their
ideological differences for the betterment of industrial relations in this
country; I have argued in a previous empirical study that most of the
time they do so.44 Rather, Board members, federal judges, and for that
matter any judicial and administrative decisionmaker in the workplace
milieu, cannot help but to bring their cultural background to bear in
deciding cases involving complex labor issues. Consequently, there is a
need to “fortify” labor and employment law “with psychological realism,”45
because there is an ongoing threat to the ideal of deciding labor and
employment law cases in an evenhanded manner.
A brief synopsis of cultural cognition theory and its related concept of
cognitive illiberalism will help to further elucidate how and why legal
decisionmakers find themselves thwarted by this unconscious psychological
barrier.
1. Cultural Cognition Theory
The judicial role in society is popularly understood by its principle
purpose of providing a fair adjudication of disputes by a neutral
decisionmaker—the judge or the jury.46 Yet, a “practical barrier” exists.47
That practical barrier is cultural cognition.
Cultural cognition, or culturally motivated cognition, describes a
series of psychological processes that help to explain existing conflict
among individuals over legally or politically consequential facts.48 This

42. Id. (“[D]isagreements are especially prevalent in labor and employment cases
where the factual issues that divide judges involve a large amount of speculation and
inconclusive evidence . . . .”); see also Kahan, supra note 23, at 58 n.328 (describing
labor and employment law disputes as being “rife with potential for cultural conflict”).
43. See Paul M. Secunda, Politics Not as Usual: Inherently Destructive Conduct,
Institutional Collegiality, and the National Labor Relations Board, 32 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 51, 87 n.200 (2004) (“Traditionally, the Board at any given time has three Members
from the President’s political party and two Members from the other party.” (citing
David A. Morand, Questioning the Preemption Doctrine: Opportunities for State-Level
Labor Law Initiatives, 5 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 35, 79–80 (1995))).
44. Id. at 105–06.
45. See Kahan et al., supra note 2 (manuscript at 4).
46. Id. (manuscript at 3).
47. Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 116 (2007).
48. See Kahan, supra note 32, at 417–18.
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is better understood in circumstances when individuals must make some
sense and determination of uncertain and inherently ambiguous facts—a
prospect not uncommon in many areas of our increasingly complex legal
landscape.
Where uncertainty and ambiguity exist, individuals must fill that
information deficit in some manner. In an effort to make sense of
indeterminate facts among competing claims and arguments about how
those facts matter, an individual will “tend selectively to credit empirical
information in patterns congenial to their cultural values.”49 At the same
time, the idea of “naïve realism” explains that people simultaneously
ignore or discount the views of people with different cultural outlooks.50
These psychologically based conflicts cause a continuing threat to
democratic pluralism by pitting subgroups with different cultural biases
against one another. Using an anthropologically based classification
system,51 studies have shown that persons with individualist, hierarchical
values tend to be skeptical about facts and arguments that support a more
communitarian or egalitarian social model because endorsing those
arguments would work counter to their culturally identified group.52
Importantly for this Article, legal decisionmakers experience some of
the same type of identity-protective pressure that nonlegal decisionmakers
face. In the judicial context, what the legally consequential facts say
largely depends upon to whom the facts are speaking. A different way of
stating this is that the way that facts will matter in a given case will be
based on how those facts are filtered and interpreted by the decisionmaker.
Thus, the ultimate interpretation of those legally consequential facts will
be distilled by the decisionmaker’s cultural worldview, likely favoring a
particular outcome in agreement with the decisionmaker’s prior cultural
worldview.53

49. Kahan et al., supra note 2 (manuscript at 8).
50. See generally Robert J. Robinson et al., Actual Versus Assumed Differences in
Construal: “Naive Realism” in Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 404 (1995) (explaining how naïve realism shapes individuals’ perceptions
of others who hold different cultural beliefs).
51. See Secunda, supra note 18, at 112–15 (discussing anthropological studies
exploring the relationship between risk perceptions and cultural worldviews).
52. Kahan et al., supra note 2 (manuscript at 9–11).
53. See Nancy Levit, Confronting Conventional Thinking: The Heuristics Problem
in Feminist Legal Theory, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 391, 394 (2006) (“[W]hen decision
makers use simplifying heuristics, they are likely to make mistakes in the direction of
their pre-existing biases.”).
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A more recent empirical study by Kahan, Hoffman, Braman, Evans,
and Rachlinski illustrates in stark detail the extent to which cultural
cognition can influence individuals’ perception of factual events.54 Study
participants, a group of 202 randomly selected adults, were randomly
assigned to view the same protest video.55 One group was told the
subject of the protest was against an abortion clinic while the other
group was told the subject of the protest was against a military recruiting
center at a university aimed at protesting the previous ban in the United
States on gays openly serving in the military.56 The participants were
instructed to act as jurors in a case that “turned on whether a group of
protesters had crossed the [constitutionally important] speech-conduct
line.”57 In the video, participants were told that the police had halted the
protest.58 Because the First Amendment protects speech, if the participants
found that the protest was speech, then the police action would be
unlawful. However, if the participants found that the protest crossed the
line from speech to conduct, the police would have a legitimate interest
in halting the protest.59
Prior to viewing the video, the study participants answered a
questionnaire and were rated based on their answers to four categories of
cultural worldviews: hierarchy individualism, hierarchy communitarianism,
egalitarian individualism, and egalitarian communitarianism.60 The
significance of the study’s findings is that even though all the subjects
viewed the same video, “what they saw—earnest voicing of dissent
intended only to persuade [lawful speech], or physical intimidation
calculated to interfere with the freedom of others [unlawful conduct]—
depended on the congruence of the protesters’ positions with the
subjects’ own cultural values.”61
The study thus starkly illustrates the phenomenon of culturally
motivated cognition and how it drives individuals’ perceptions of legally
consequential factual events. Ultimately, the participants’ perception of
the same protest was heavily influenced by their culturally motivated
54. See Kahan et al., supra note 2.
55. Id. (manuscript at 16).
56. Id. (manuscript at 17); see also Videoreview12, Abortion Clinic 11 22 2010,
YOUTUBE (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k8ru-FE2v_8; Videoreview12,
Recruit_Center_11192919.m4v, YOUTUBE (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=X3PJACpL53k.
57. Kahan et al., supra note 2 (manuscript at 13).
58. Id.
59. Id. (manuscript at 11–12).
60. See id. (manuscript at 16–17). These worldview categories are based on the
work of the noted anthropologist Mary Douglas. See generally MARY DOUGLAS, NATURAL
SYMBOLS: EXPLORATIONS IN COSMOLOGY 54–68 (1970) (describing group social patterns
based on shared worldviews).
61. Kahan et al., supra note 2 (manuscript at 28).
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cognition to either support the police action to halt the protest or
disapprove the police action. It is this filtering process which explains
the mechanism by which individuals fill perceived gaps in knowledge
with an interpretation that accords with their prior cultural worldview.
Understanding cultural cognition as a practical barrier to the neutrality
commitment of judges in the exercise of their judicial role is important
because the mechanics are both unconscious and natural.62 Although
some judges can rightly be accused of engaging in an outright ideologically
motivated form of judicial bias, this Article maintains that the majority
of judges are sincerely not engaged in this kind of ideologically based
decisionmaking.63 Rather, a better and perhaps more helpful understanding
is that “[s]tates of persistent group polarization are . . . inevitable—almost
mathematically so—as beliefs feed on themselves within cultural groups,
whose members stubbornly dismiss as unworthy insights originating
outside the group.”64 In short, it is the very mechanics of cultural cognition
that push individuals to adopt viewpoints that favor their identified cultural
worldview and lead to a phenomenon known as cognitive illiberalism.
2. Cognitive Illiberalism
Culturally motivated cognition is particularly problematic for legal
decisionmakers because it leads to the phenomenon of cognitive
illiberalism. Cognitive illiberalism is “the vulnerability of . . . legal
decisionmakers to betray their commitment to liberal neutrality by
unconsciously fitting their perceptions of risk and related facts to their
sectarian understanding of the good life.”65 As a result of this bias, the
critical checking function performed by the judiciary is subject to
unwitting corruption.66
Another danger of cognitive illiberalism is that individuals are very
poor at identifying when they themselves are engaged in cognitive
illiberal bias, but are quite adept at identifying when others engage in

62. See id. (manuscript at 28–29).
63. See Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies
That Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE
L.J. 1895, 1964 (2009) (“There may be some judges who care little about their colleagues’
views and who are determined not to engage in collegial interactions. However, they are
not in the majority.”).
64. Kahan, supra note 47, at 125.
65. Kahan et al., supra note 2 (manuscript at 29).
66. Id. (manuscript at 10).
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such bias.67 In the labor and employment law context, this dynamic
transforms everyday legal debates over how to provide justice and fairness
in the workplace into instances of political and legal status competition
between management and labor interests. In this regard, one need only
consider recent, heated debates between management and labor interests
concerning gender discrimination against women in the American
workplace,68 the need for private and public sector unions in the
American workplace,69 and the debate over whether the employment atwill doctrine should be discarded into the dustbin of history.70 It often
seems that the parties to these debates live in completely different
realities.
It is when legal decisionmaking engages in this hubristic
overconfidence in favor of the prevailing judge’s cultural worldview that
cognitive illiberalism endangers judicial legitimacy and its commitment
to neutrality. A court majority, unconsciously motivated by cultural
cognition, runs the risk of denigrating any differing viewpoint of a
minority cultural identity group as an unreasonable interpretation of a set
of legally consequential facts. In other words, this type of psychologically
tarnished decisionmaking will invariably delegitimize the legal justification
for the court’s decision in the eyes of the thwarted cultural group.71

67. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing the psychological concept of
naïve realism).
68. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2544–45 (2011)
(finding that massive gender discrimination in employment class action could not be
maintained consistent with requirements of federal class action rules).
69. The recent labor dispute over the rights of public sector union employees in
Wisconsin, and the complaint filed by the NLRB against Boeing for allegedly retaliating
against its unions by moving work from Washington to South Carolina, are two such
examples. See A.G. Sulzberger & Monica Davey, Union Bonds in Wisconsin Begin to
Fray, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/
22/us/22union.html (“Mr. Walker, the new Republican governor who has proposed the
cuts to benefits and bargaining rights, argu[es] that he desperately needs to bridge a
deficit expected to reach $3.6 billion for the coming two-year budget.”); Editorial, The
NLRB v. Boeing, L.A. TIMES (June 15, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/15/
opinion/la-ed-boeing-20110615 (“The National Labor Relations Board accused Boeing
earlier this year of illegally retaliating against unionized workers by expanding its facilities in
a largely nonunion state, South Carolina. Republicans joined much of corporate America in
denouncing the board’s complaint, calling it a barely disguised attack on state ‘right to
work’ laws that make it harder for unions to organize.”).
70. One of the primary debates surrounding the drafting of the Restatement (Third)
of Employment Law is whether the concept of at-will employment—under which employees
can be fired for good, bad, or no cause—should continue to be enshrined in American
employment law. See, e.g., Matthew W. Finkin, Second Thoughts on a Restatement of
Employment Law, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 279 (2005).
71. See, e.g., Rebecca M. Bratspies, Regulatory Trust, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 575, 620
(2009) (“[D]ifferent groups respond to the suggestion that a reinvigorated nuclear energy
program is needed to respond to global warming. For those opposed to nuclear energy,
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This is especially so because the nonpreferred group will readily
recognize the occurrence of cognitive illiberalism as the underlying basis
for the decision, rather than recognize the legal merits of that decision,
no matter how justified those merits may be.72 Consider in this regard
the polarization caused by Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker’s attempt
to legislate out of existence most public sector collective bargaining
rights. As predicted by cognitive illiberalism, those who favor
minimalist government and management rights favor the legislation, while
those who believe government should promote collective bargaining as a
fundamental human right are dead set against it. 73 Rather than
suggesting that either side is absolutely right in this controversy, this
recent labor law real-world example illustrates well how cognitive
illiberalism leads inevitably to the delegitimization of the law from the
perspective of the losing party—in this case, the union side.
It was this same cognitive illiberalism that lead Kahan, Hoffman, and
Braman to criticize the decision announced by Justice Scalia in Scott v.
Harris that “no reasonable jury” could reach a verdict that the police
were not justified in using deadly force to end the car chase given the
police videotape.74 In many of the same ways, Justices and judges are
privileging one cultural worldview over that of another in a number of
important labor and employment law cases.75 This phenomenon of
culturally motivated cognition endangers judicial legitimacy because the

the juxtaposition of the two issues seems absurd; but to those in favor of the technology
the linkage is obvious.”).
72. In the context of assessing legal facts regarding risk, “individuals perceive the
law as denigrating their visions of the good not merely when political actors [for
example, judges] justify it on culturally partisan grounds but also when they justify it on
the basis of perceptions of harm distinctive of their worldviews.” Kahan, supra note 47,
at 152.
73. Compare Jill Cook, Wisconsin Labor Protests: Labor Union Negotiations Hold
Back Economic Progress, ALESTLELIVE (Mar. 3, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.alestlelive.
com/opinion/article_3b756db7-5dde-54ae-94ab-6da2873be108.html (“Collective bargaining
has become an overly abused tool for greed and excused failure.”), with Samuel A.
Culbert, Op-Ed., Why Your Boss Is Wrong About You, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2011), http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/03/02/opinion/02culbert.html?r=1&src=twrhp (“Unions in Wisconsin
are justified in worrying that limiting collective bargaining would lead to capricious
firing or demotions, whether for age, personality, salary or any other criterion you can
think of.”).
74. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); Kahan et al., supra note 1, at 879–81.
75. See Secunda, supra note 18, at 121–38 (providing examples of where cognitive
illiberalism has resulted from the operation of culturally motivated cognition in recent
U.S. Supreme Court labor and employment law cases).
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underpinning of law should not be based on privileged worldviews but
on inclusive or neutral criteria.
In any event, whether it is in labor and employment cases, constitutional
law cases, or other cases, little doubt exists that the legitimacy of the
courts is a pressing social concern. This is especially so in the broader
judicial context outside of the Supreme Court among the lower federal
and state courts where most cases are decided. These decisions have
local implications for the parties involved in the litigation as well as for
society as a whole. While “[t]here’s no accepted index of legitimacy for
the court . . . . [a]round the world, [the United States Supreme Court’s]
influence has declined, measured by the number of times top courts in
other countries cite it.”76 As United States Supreme Court Justice Stephen
Breyer and other court commentators recognize, the legitimacy of the
courts depends to a large degree upon society’s perception of the judiciary
as a neutral decisionmaking body.77
So, culturally motivated cognition not only provides a working theory
about how most legal decisionmakers interpret legally consequential
facts but also helps to explain the formation of cognitive illiberalism and
the delegitimization of the very neutrality that most judges wish to
foster. But methods do exist for counteracting these inherent biases. As
Kahan and his co-authors aptly point out, “[J]ust like the rest of us,
[judges] are perfectly capable of understanding that these dynamics exist
and can adversely affect the quality of their decisionmaking.”78
To the extent that one sees cognitive illiberalism as being a consequence
of unjust labor and employment law decisions, it is necessary to consider
a number of institutional reforms that might help to eliminate both
culturally motivated cognition from labor and employment law decisions
and the prevalence of cognitive illiberalism surrounding disputes over
labor policy in the United States. The next Part maintains that because
better informed legal decisionmakers are more aware of their own
culturally motivated cognition and the cognitive illiberalism it can engender
76. See Lincoln Caplan, Editorial, A Judge’s Warning About the Legitimacy of the
Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2010, at A22 (discussing STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING
OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW (2010)).
77. In this regard, Justice Breyer’s view is that “the [C]ourt jeopardizes its
legitimacy when it makes . . . radical rulings and that, in doing so, it threatens our
democracy.” See id. Indeed, perceived procedural fairness of judicial decisionmaking
affects legitimacy more than agreement with outcomes. See generally TOM R. TYLER,
WHY PEOPLE COOPERATE: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MOTIVATIONS (2011) (discussing what
motivates individuals to cooperate with others, including legal institutions); TOM R.
TYLER, W HY P EOPLE O BEY THE L AW (Princeton Univ. Press 2006) (explaining
what motivates citizens to follow the law).
78. Kahan et al., supra note 1, at 898; see also Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the
Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007) (suggesting judges
employ an “intuition-override” model of decisionmaking).

386

[VOL. 49: 373, 2012]

Cognitive Illiberalism
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

throughout society, a spectrum of judicial reform approaches should be
explored to see whether all or parts of these debiasing strategies could
help overcome legal decisionmakers’ psychological limitations in deciding
labor and employment law cases. These approaches range from fairly
simple opinion-writing debiasing techniques to specialized courts and
judges in the federal judiciary to the more radical idea of employment
tribunals based on the British model.
III. A SPECTRUM OF DEBIASING STRATEGIES
The purpose of this Part is not to try to find a one-size-fits-all approach to
culturally motivated cognition and the related phenomenon of cognitive
illiberalism in labor and employment law cases. Rather, the idea is to
provide a series of potential debiasing mechanisms that might counteract
some of the more stark examples of illiberal bias of cognitive origin in
these cases. To be clear, the idea here is not simply to target culturally
motivated cognition in the sense of wanting legal decisionmakers to craft
more inclusive and less biased decisions, although that is certainly an
important goal. The judicial reforms discussed below are also crucially
concerned with an even greater problem: how labor and employment law
decisions are communicated and perceived, and, as a consequence, may
impact public discourse on important workplace issues.79
It is also important to understand that these suggested reforms are not
meant to be mutually exclusive. For instance, creating a specialized
employment court to help counteract cultural cognition will not necessarily
eliminate the need for judges to become cognizant of their own illiberal
biases and utilize various opinion-writing debiasing techniques. Quite to
the contrary, debiasing techniques are relevant to our current judicial
system and would remain relevant in any potential future system in
which employment courts are utilized. However, the systemic advantages
of a specialized employment judiciary—the expertise and familiarity
specialized employment judges would have—coupled together with the
proactive utilization of debiasing techniques might offer the best
solution for enhancing the way in which labor and employment law
decisions are communicated to the larger public.
79. See Kahan, supra note 23, at 28 (“The account I am proposing, though, doesn’t
depend on the impact of motivated reasoning on judges. It is directed at the impact of
motivated reasoning on citizens’ assessments of judges’ decisions.”).
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This Part is divided into four subparts, starting with the least drastic
measures to consideration of more drastic ones. After reviewing
opinion-writing debiasing techniques for legal decisionmakers, this Part
then discusses institutional debiasing strategies, including (1) magistrate
models, (2) bankruptcy court models, (3) a specialized appellate court,
and (4) the British employment tribunal model.
A. Opinion-Writing Debiasing Techniques
Cultural Cognition at Work discussed two different opinion-writing
techniques for counteracting judicial cognitive bias: first, humility as a
judicial habit of mind, and second, expressive overdetermination and
self-affirmation.80 These two concepts dovetail nicely with a third method
for debiasing outlined by Cass Sunstein in his article, Trimming.81
“Trimming” involves a legal or political process by which individuals
“reject the extremes and . . . borrow ideas from both sides in intense
social controversies.”82 These approaches work particularly well with
judges because “[t]here is . . . convincing evidence that judges, when
engaged in certain tasks distinctive of their professional role, are better
able to resist various forms of at least some cognitive biases than are lay
people under similar circumstances.”83
1. Judicial Humility and Aporetic Engagement
The technique of judicial humility calls for a state of mind that
recognizes that judges are susceptible to making mistakes in their
decisions.84 More recently, Dan Kahan has also called for “judicial
idioms of aporia,” or a mode of argumentation that acknowledges the
complexity of many legal issues.85 This approach would counter the
universal tendency of judges to state their views in their legal opinions in

80. Secunda, supra note 18, at 140–48.
81. Cass R. Sunstein, Trimming, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (2009).
82. Id. at 1053.
83. Kahan et al., supra note 2 (manuscript at 36).
84. See Secunda, supra note 18, at 140–41. For a wonderful recent example of
judicial humility in opinion writing by Judge William G. Young of the U. S. District
Court for the District of Massachusetts, see United States v. Massachusetts, 781 F. Supp.
2d 1, 13–15 (D. Mass. 2011), in which Judge Young openly acknowledges the dangers
of conflating fact-finding with legal explanation and admits his prior decision granting
summary judgment in a Title VII disparate impact case was clearly erroneous.
85. See Kahan, supra note 23, at 62. Whereas “‘[h]umility’ connotes consciousness of
one’s own limits in solving a problem; aporia emphasizes the limited amenability of the
problem to a satisfactory solution, along with apprehension of the same.” Id. at 62 n.347.
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an unequivocal manner.86 A high degree of “[c]ertitude in opinions also
enhances the tendency of those whose identities are threatened by the
decision to suspect bias by the Court.”87
Moreover, judicial fallibility is especially possible in cases that elicit
community outrage.88 By recognizing the potential for community
outrage and engaging in judicial humility, judges can more readily selfcorrect for their own cognitive biases that may bear upon how they view
legally consequential facts,89 while simultaneously avoiding
“pronouncements of certitude [that] deepen group-based conflict.”90
Indeed, recent research on educating judges about their own biases has
shown that “more precise techniques in encouraging self-analysis” or more
systematic consideration of counterarguments may be more successful
than past debiasing strategies.91
Judges with the sensitivity to acknowledge potential community
outrage over decisions are also better prepared to draft decisions without
the appearance of partisan motivations or the denigration of the concerns
held by the community group on the losing side of these cases.92
Moreover, the concepts of judicial humility and aporetic engagement
address one of the core pitfalls of cognitive illiberalism: that a community
group can easily recognize when a community group with opposing
views is engaging in cognitive illiberal bias, but cannot recognize its
own.93 Judges, like other individuals, are prisoners of their own
worldviews and may be blind to the influence of these underlying
perspectives. In short, the practices of humility and writing opinions in
an aporetic manner encourage judges to self-reflect on how culturally
motivated cognition may color their view of legally consequential facts
86. See id. at 60. This phenomenon stems from the fact that “[j]udges . . . are likely to
believe that frankly acknowledging the vulnerability of their reasoning to counterarguments
will invite the suspicion that they are deciding on the basis of some personal value or
interest.” Id.
87. Id. at 62.
88. Secunda, supra note 18, at 140–41 (noting Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would
Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 155, 159, 183
(2007)).
89. Id. (citing Kahan et al., supra note 1, at 898).
90. Kahan, supra note 23, at 60.
91. Secunda, supra note 18, at 143 (quoting Nancy Levit, Confronting Conventional
Thinking: The Heuristics Problem in Feminist Legal Theory, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 391,
436–37 (2006)).
92. See Kahan et al., supra note 1, at 898–99.
93. Kahan, supra note 23, at 61. Such naïve realism “lubricates the mechanisms of
group conflict.” Id.
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and, thereafter, avoid basing decisions on those biases.94 To be clear,
however, such approaches do not necessarily change the outcome of the
legal dispute, only the manner in which the dispute is analyzed and the
way in which its resolution is communicated to the larger public.95
2. Expressive Overdetermination
Expressive overdetermination is a debiasing technique that encourages
judges to interpret laws in a manner that seeks to accommodate
competing worldviews.96 Or as Dan Kahan has explained more specifically,
“Expressive overdetermination is a technique that embeds information
bearing a potentially identity-threatening social meaning in a message
frame that evocatively conveys additional, identity-affirming meanings.”97
Through this accommodation, the hope is that each community can
find meanings in the decision that affirm some of its worldviews.
Individuals may be able to find validation for their views in some aspect
of the law because these types of legal decisions incorporate “a plurality
of meanings.”98 Although such an expressive overdetermination approach
might not work well with judges who are ideologically committed to one
way of looking at the world,99 cultural cognition theory maintains that
most judges are not partisan warriors.100 Rather, judges “subscribe to an
elaborate network of craft norms. Acquired through professional training
and experience, these norms generate a high degree of convergence among
judges and lawyers on what counts as appropriate decisionmaking.”101
Such appropriate decisionmaking should include a “psychologically realistic

94. Yet, “[e]ven if the Justices were themselves unaffected by cultural cognition,
then, it would be essential to their function as our constitutional system’s neutral arbiters
to use idioms of justification that counteract cultural cognition in the public assessment
of their decisions.” Id. at 28.
95. Id. at 62 (“Aporetic engagement does not preclude a definitive outcome or
resolution. But it necessarily treats as false—a sign of misunderstanding—any resolution of
the problem that purports to be unproblematic.”).
96. Secunda, supra note 18, at 144–45.
97. Kahan, supra note 23, at 67 (citing Kahan, supra note 47, at 146).
98. Kahan, supra note 47, at 146–47; see also Kahan, supra note 23, at 71
(“A psychologically realistic understanding of constitutional law tells us that the Court is
most likely to accomplish [the goal of assuring us of its impartiality] not through
theoretical abstractions but through idioms and gestures that convey a plurality of cultural
meanings.”).
99. See Kahan, supra note 23, at 76 (“Justices who deface the public image of the
Court by repeated acts of rhetorical vandalism are unlikely to respond to pleas for them
to stop.”).
100. See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 63, at 1964 (“There may be some
judges who care little about their colleagues’ views and who are determined not to
engage in collegial interactions. However, they are not in the majority.”).
101. Kahan, supra note 23, at 27.
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understanding of how the Court should communicate its commitment to
using [judicial interpretation] methods impartially.”102
3. Trimming
Trimming incorporates all of the techniques discussed above for
combating cognitive illiberalism. Trimming, according to Sunstein, is a
decision procedure that “requires close attention to all points of view,
including the poles.”103 Because a judicial trimmer follows a framework
that considers all points of view across a spectrum, “contemporary
trimmers . . . tend to end up between the extremes, in a way that makes
both believe that they have gained, or not lost, something of importance.”104
Thus, expressive overdetermination is a technique that is essential to
trimming due to the fact that individuals with opposite worldviews can
find affirmation in the underlying basis for a judicial decision.
Furthermore, the trimmer operates from a decision procedure that
explores the merits of the other side’s argument and seeks to preserve
what can be valuably drawn from those arguments.105 To explore the
merits of the other side’s argument, a judge would need to exercise a
judicial habit of mind-fostering humility and utilize idioms of aporia to
acknowledge that his or her worldview alone does not illuminate fully
the significance of legally consequential facts and their effect on how a
case should be decided.
What makes Sunstein’s concept of trimming relevant as a debiasing
technique is that this approach does not just encourage judges to listen to
the other side, but rather encourages judges to identify “what is deepest
and most appealing in competing positions” so as to ensure that “to the
extent possible, no one is, or feels, rejected or repudiated.”106 This is not
to say, however, that trimming involves finding the middle ground between
two competing worldviews.107 In fact, trimming is not analogous to a

102. Id. at 59.
103. Sunstein, supra note 81, at 1054.
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. Id. at 1059.
107. Like Kahan, “I would resist the claim . . . that expressive overdetermination could
or should be implemented through a Missouri Compromise pattern of results.” Kahan, supra
note 23, at 69.
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moderate political affiliation because moderates “do not much care about
the competing positions, and are not trying to steer between them.”108
By engaging in a trimming experiment, judges may be able to best
“capture the most plausible convictions of the adversaries.”109 By
engaging in a process that facilitates capturing the deepest convictions
held by competing worldviews, judges can show respect for all views
while avoiding decisions based on their own culturally biased
motivations. 110 This approach will, in turn, help judges avoid being
“unwittingly impelled to form perceptions of fact, interpretations of
doctrines, and evaluations of legal arguments congenial to their own
worldviews.”111
B. Institutional Debiasing Strategies
In addition to the opinion-writing debiasing strategies discussed
above, another promising method for debiasing judges in labor and
employment law cases is through making them more familiar with legal
doctrine in this area of law. The thought is that the more familiar judges
are with a complex doctrine, the less likely they will need to fall back on
culturally motivated cognition to fill in holes in their knowledge base.
The number of labor and employment law cases by itself may not
obviously support the creation of a separate court system as comprehensive
as that of the bankruptcy courts. Yet, when looking at the number of
cases commenced in the U.S. district courts in 2009—the last year that
caseload statistics were available for the federal courts in February
2011—a picture emerges of a large number of actions involving labor
law cases and civil rights employment-related claims. For instance,
during 2009, there were over 17,000 labor cases, including Fair Labor
Standards Act hours and wages cases, traditional labor cases under the
National Labor Relations Act and Railway Labor Act, and ERISA cases,
and nearly 15,000 civil rights-related employment cases such as
employment discrimination claims under Title VII, the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act.112 In the
area of labor law alone, litigation increased by 19.08% from 2000 to

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Sunstein, supra note 81, at 1059.
Id. at 1061.
See id. at 1070.
See Kahan, supra note 23, at 27.
See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS:
MARCH 31, 2009, at 49–50 tbl.C-2 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 CASELOAD STATISTICS],
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicial
CaseloadStatistics/2009/tables/C02Mar09.pdf.
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2009.113 Furthermore, reflecting the growing complexity of labor law
cases, the number of actions pending for three years or more increased
by 69.25% during the same period.114
In addition to the growing number and importance of labor and
employment law cases in the federal system, two arguments favor the
creation of a specialized court system or specialized judges for
employment-related matters within the federal court system. First, the
growing complexity of labor and employment law calls for a vigorous
response within the federal judiciary by creating a mechanism for the
speedy, efficient, and equitable adjudication of employment actions.
There is complexity in this area because (1) the decisional law is
complicated, (2) there are a large number of overlapping statutes on the
federal and state level, and (3) in many instances, there is an additional
layer of complexity by virtue of the fact that federal and state agencies
are making, enforcing, and applying the law before a case ever reaches a
court.115 By steering employment cases to those judges with expertise
113. Compare ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD
STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2001, at 46 tbl.C-2 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 CASELOAD
STATISTICS], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCase
loadStatistics/2001/tables/c02mar01.pdf, with 2009 CASELOAD STATISTICS, supra note
112, at 50 tbl.C-2.
114. Compare JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 58
tbl.S-11 (2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/Judicial
Business.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/tables/S11Sep09.pdf,
with LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2000 JUDICIAL
BUSINESS: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 60 tbl.S-11 (2000), available at http://www.
uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2000/tables/s11sep00.pdf. Although the
number seems high, the comparison does not seem so great when compared to the
percentage of cases pending for three years over the number of cases commenced the
same year. To illustrate this point, the number of cases filed under labor law for 2009
was 17,127 while the number of labor law cases pending for three years or more during
that same year was 633, or 3.7% of the total. See 2009 CASELOAD STATISTICS, supra
note 112, at 50 tbl.C-2; DUFF, supra, at 58 tbl.S-11. Contrast this with the year 2000
where the total number of actions commenced under labor law was 14,383 while actions
pending for three years or more for matters falling under labor law were 374, or 2.6% of
the total. See 2001 CASELOAD STATISTICS, supra note 113, at 46 tbl.C-2; MECHAM,
supra, at 60 tbl.S-11. Thus the increase in the number of cases pending for more than
three years in relation to the total number of actions commenced that same year results in
a comparative increase of only 1.1%.
115. In this regard, labor and employment law appears to be even more complex
than many other areas of the law. See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Law of Termination: Doing
More with Less, 68 M D . L. R EV . 89 (2008). Hirsch has noted that “[t]he laws and
regulations governing the American workplace reveal a level of complexity and
uncertainty that rivals virtually any other area of law.” Id. at 89. Furthermore, the
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and familiarity with labor and employment law, some of this complexity
may be better handled and the goals of efficiency and fairness may be
realistically attained.
Second, by assigning employment-related cases to judges steeped in
knowledge and familiarity of labor and employment law, the residuary
goal of ensuring that a specialized cadre of judges will adjudicate labor
law cases free of culturally motivated cognition will be promoted.
Because these judges will not be faced with the need to fill in gaps in
knowledge in the same way or to the same degree that a generalist judge
would need to do, judges specialized in labor and employment law may
be better equipped to fairly adjudicate cases without the corrupting
unconscious influence of this illiberal bias. In turn, cognitive illiberalism
will be diminished when more evenhandedly decided cases are processed
by “losers” in the politico-legal wars.116
This specialized court or judge model could work in the federal court
system through at least three approaches, (1) the appointment of a
federal magistrate specialized in this area of the law, (2) the creation of a
labor and employment law court based on the Article I bankruptcy court
model, or (3) the establishment of a specialized appellate court, much
like the current Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. Outside of the federal
system, other countries, like the United Kingdom, provide additional
examples on how administrative tribunals may be implemented to
counteract the problem of cognitive illiberalism in labor and employment
law cases.

growing complexity of one type of labor and employment law case, employment
discrimination cases, has been frequently and recently discussed by legal scholars. See,
e.g., William R. Corbett, Babbling About Employment Discrimination Law: Does the
Master Builder Understand the Blueprint for the Great Tower?, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 683,
690–91 (2010) (noting the current complexity in employment discrimination law);
Martin J. Katz, Gross Disunity, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 857, 858 (2010) (noting the Court’s
shift away from interpreting discrimination statutes to bring about uniformity); Sandra F.
Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 75 (2011) (noting the
complexity in disparate treatment and disparate impact law).
116. Indeed, the same diminishment of culturally motivated cognition in legal
decisionmaking would also occur in other complex areas of the law if a similar approach
were to be followed.
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1. Magistrate Model
One of the more interesting trends in the federal system from the
twentieth to the twenty-first century is the increasing number of statutory
judges supplementing the role of their Article III counterparts. There are
more than 550 magistrate judgeships serving at the district court level,
not many short of the 678 judgeships slotted for Article III district court
judges.117 Article III judges, however, retain important control over statutory
judges through the selection, appointment, and reappointment process
itself.118 This is important in that “[t]hose chosen to be constitutional
judges therefore not only shape the law through adjudication; they also
shape the law by deciding who will serve as our statutory judges.”119
The authorizing statute for magistrate judges specifies several
requirements when district courts make appointments.120 One selection
criteria is that magistrate judges are required to have several years of
experience as a practicing attorney.121 For the selection process itself,
district courts are required to use “‘merit selection panels,’ to be ‘composed
of residents of the individual judicial districts, to assist the courts in
identifying and recommending persons best qualified to fill such
positions.’”122
The merit selection panels are also required to give “due consideration
to all qualified individuals, especially such groups as women, blacks,
Hispanics, and other minorities.”123 Finally, the Judicial Conference of
the United States has issued guidelines for “both the appointment and
the reappointment of magistrate judges.”124 Ultimately, the final
decision on the selection of candidates for magistrate judgeships resides

117. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES 2008, at
tbl.1.1 (2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAnd
Figures/2008/Table101.pdf.
118. See 28 U.S.C. § 631 (2006 & Supp. 2010) (magistrate judicial selection); 28
U.S.C. § 152 (2006) (bankruptcy judicial selection).
119. See Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory: Demand, Supply,
and Life Tenure, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 579, 607 (2005).
120. See 28 U.S.C. § 631.
121. Id. § 631(b)(1).
122. Resnik, supra note 119, at 607 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 631(b)).
123. Id. (quoting Federal Magistrates Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, § 3(c), (e), 93
Stat. 643, 644–45 (1979) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 636 (2006))).
124. Id. (citing MAGISTRATE JUDGES DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, THE
SELECTION, APPOINTMENT, AND REAPPOINTMENT OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGES
(2002)).
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with the Article III judges of each district court.125 Article III judges are
also responsible for the decision of whether to reappoint magistrate
judges at the end of their eight-year term.126
Unfortunately, under current rules, magistrate judges cannot be funneled
only certain types of cases, like labor and employment actions, by the
district courts.127 Therefore, to allow the district courts to direct labor
and employment cases to a specified magistrate judge—presumably with
extensive background and knowledge about labor and employment
law—Congress would need to pass legislation allowing the practice.
Though the present system poses an obstacle to utilizing a particular
magistrate judge within a federal district to hear labor and employment
cases, it also offers an opportunity for experimentation to pilot the use of
a designated labor and employment judge.128 By allowing a district
court to utilize, on a trial basis, a specialized magistrate for hearing labor
and employment cases, more information can be gathered about the
model’s usefulness and the case for expanding the use of specialized
labor and employment judges to effectively address the danger of cognitive
illiberalism surrounding labor and employment law decisions can be
further built.
2. Bankruptcy Court Model
The bankruptcy court system within the federal district courts offers
another possible model for the development of specialized employment
judges to handle labor and employment cases.129 A particularly attractive
aspect of the bankruptcy court model is its statutory status, obviating the
125.
126.
127.

See 28 U.S.C. § 631.
Id. § 631(a), (e).
MAGISTRATE JUDGES DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, INVENTORY OF
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE DUTIES 141 (3d ed. 1999).
To exercise civil consent authority, a magistrate judge must be “specially
designated” by the district court under § 636(c)(1). Congress provided that the
designation must be general in nature and cannot be limited to certain specific
categories of civil cases. H.R. Rep. No. 287, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. 11 (1979).
The civil consent authority of a magistrate judge so designated is thus limited
only by the general civil jurisdiction of the district court itself.
Id. (emphasis added).
128. Consider, in this regard, other pilot projects that courts have undertaken to improve
judicial administration and efficiency. For instance, the Judicial Conference of the
United States recently approved a pilot project to allow cameras in federal district court
courtrooms. See Judiciary Approves Pilot Project for Cameras in District Court, U.S. COURTS
(Sept. 2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/TheThirdBranch/10-09-01/Judiciary_Approves_
Pilot_Project_for_Cameras_in_District_Courts.aspx.
129. The idea would be for such courts to handle Article I labor and employment
law cases over which federal courts presently have exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction.
The current proposal does not contemplate interfering with the primary jurisdiction of
the NLRB or other such federal or state agencies’ jurisdiction.
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need to create a fully separate and newly formed Article III employment
court. The bankruptcy courts handle far more cases than a specialized
group of employment judges would.130 But despite this disparity, the
bankruptcy system offers a couple of core strengths that are worth
emulating: first, autonomy and independence from political pressure, and
second, the overall quality of bankruptcy judges.
The selection, appointment, and reappointment of bankruptcy judges
works in a similar fashion to the procedures for the selection of magistrates,
except the federal courts of appeals have decisionmaking authority and
are not bound by the same statutory requirements for the selection of
magistrate judges.131 The Judicial Conference has issued guidelines for
the selection of bankruptcy judges,132 but there are variations on the
procedure across the federal circuits.133 The following is one example of
the selection process for a bankruptcy judge in the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
First, a local merit-screening committee will review applications from
candidates for open bankruptcy positions.134 The local merit-screening
committee will review the applications and recommend no more than
five candidates for consideration to the Court-Council Committee on
Bankruptcy Appointments.135 The local merit-screening committee is
made up of (1) the chief judge of the federal judicial district in which the
bankruptcy judge is to be appointed; (2) the president of the state bar
association; (3) the president(s) of one or more local bar associations within
the district; (4) the dean of a law school located within the district; (5) the
administrative circuit judge or the designee of the administrative circuit
judge of the circuit geographical unit in which the bankruptcy judge is to
130. The number of bankruptcy filings for 2009 was 1,473,675, while the aggregate
total of labor law case filings together with civil rights employment-related matters was
31,763. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS: 12-MONTH
PERIOD ENDING DECEMBER 2009, at tbl.F-2 (2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2009/1209_f2.pdf; 2009 CASELOAD
STATISTICS, supra note 112, at 49–50 tbl.C-2.
131. Resnik, supra note 119, at 607–08 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 152 (2000)).
132. See J UDICIAL C ONFERENCE OF THE U.S., R EGULATIONS OF THE J UDICIAL
C ONFERENCE OF THE U NITED S TATES FOR THE S ELECTION , A PPOINTMENT , AND
REAPPOINTMENT OF UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGES (2006), available at http://www.
ca5.uscourts.gov/news/news/2011_ce_stx_qualif.pdf.
133. Resnik, supra note 119, at 608.
134. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT, REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE
APPOINTMENT OF U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGES § 3.03(c)(1) (2001), available at http://www3.
ce9.uscourts.gov/web/ocelibra.nsf/0/392dbd6884261adb88256afd0060030f?OpenDocument.
135. Id.
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be appointed; and (6) the chief bankruptcy judge of the district in which
the bankruptcy judge is to be appointed, except when a resident incumbent
judge is seeking appointment to an additional term.136 The members of
the Court-Council Committee, consisting of no more than five members
with at least three being circuit court judges with voting authority,
recommend to the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council, in a report, a candidate
for appointment.137 The Judicial Council then reviews the recommendations
and either determines that the Court-Council Committee should reconsider
the candidate or recommends the candidate to the Court of Appeals.138
The candidate will then be appointed upon a majority vote by the members
of the Court of Appeals.139
Even though bankruptcy judges lack the protections of Article III
judges with life tenure and secure compensation,140 bankruptcy judges
are arguably more insulated from the legislative and executive branches
than federal district judges.141 The selection process of bankruptcy judges
by the courts of appeals encourages merit-based selection of bankruptcy
judges based on their professional credentials rather than their political
leanings.142 Because bankruptcy judges, as non-Article III judges, do
not require nomination by the President with the advice and consent of
the Senate, these judges are shielded to some extent from the political
branches.143 Instead of relying on a political appointment process, the
bankruptcy appointment process relies on the bankruptcy bar.144
The bankruptcy bar encourages creativity in the management of cases
and efficient resolution of complex cases.145 In short, a reciprocal
relationship exists between the bankruptcy judiciary and the bankruptcy
bar in that both groups seek the promotion of a skilled professional
bankruptcy judiciary that places a high value on “pragmatic solutions to
financial distress.”146 In addition, the relationship between the bankruptcy
bar and bankruptcy judges promotes consensus among the groups’ members
on the “general aims of bankruptcy law and the ideal workings of the
process.”147

136. Id. § 3.02(a).
137. Id. § 3.04(c)(5).
138. Id. § 3.05(a).
139. Id. § 4.01; see also 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(3) (2006).
140. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
141. See Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy
Courts, 62 STAN. L. REV. 747, 793 (2010).
142. Id. at 793–94.
143. Id. at 794.
144. See id. at 795.
145. Id. at 798.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 804.
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The apparatus of the bankruptcy court system may be an ideal model
for formulating a comparable system of employment judges within the
federal judiciary. Indeed, the appointment process for bankruptcy judges is
worthy of emulation. The ultimate goal in the creation of a system of
employment courts as Article I courts with a similar scope of authority
as bankruptcy courts within the federal court system would be the
development of a professionalized class of labor and employment judges
with expertise and familiarity in labor and employment law in the
adjudicatory process.
Emulation of the appointment process of the bankruptcy courts may
encourage the development of a class of employment judges that can better
communicate with the labor and employment bar and other employment
scholars on the general aims of labor and employment law and the ideal
workings of the process. Moreover, the appointment process of bankruptcy
judges is also worth imitating from the standpoint of shielding a labor
and employment judge from political pressures. This is a significant
advantage given the highly partisan nature of labor and employment
disputes between union and management or between employer and
employee.
By minimizing the need to garner favor among politically connected
actors, employment judges may not feel the need to curry favor from
those political actors in order to obtain promotion to the federal bench or
reappointment to an additional term as an employment judge. Free from
these political considerations, labor and employment judges would have
more freedom to focus on “professional, creative, and nonideological
adjudication” of labor and employment-related cases.148
From a cognitive illiberalism perspective, the creation of Article I
employment courts as an institutional debiasing strategy would also be a
beneficial development. Because “[j]udges . . . report seeing different
things when they make and review findings of fact akin” to most
individuals,149 it is important that they not only become familiar with the
law, but also with the concerns and ideas of the labor and employment
law bar. The upshot, as is seen when judges engage in thorough and

148.
149.

Id. at 793.
Kahan et al., supra note 2 (manuscript at 37).
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good faith deliberation, like on an appellate panel, is less dispositive
disagreement over legally consequential facts.150
Of course one of the practical problems with establishing a labor and
employment law court based on the bankruptcy model is to convince
Congress to pass legislation similar to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978.151 Passage of such a law in the current political environment is
hard to imagine. Nevertheless, because of the unhappiness of both
management and union interests in the way labor and employment law
cases get decided through a myriad of courts and federal and state
administrative agencies, there is a possibility that the two sides could
coalesce around an arrangement that allows greater access to judicial
institutions with greater expertise in this area of the law and promises
that future developments in this area of the law would be more
predictable and uniform.152 Those promises alone may make the creation of
such an Article I court something that both management and union
interests should consider seriously.
3. Article III Appellate Court Model
An even more far-reaching model on the debiasing strategy spectrum
for employment courts is to adopt a separate Article III labor and
employment appellate court, similar to the one established for intellectual
property cases by the creation of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.153
150. See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 63, at 1963 (“[T]he process of
deliberation in a collegial environment can reduce the impact of any individual judge’s
cultural cognition.”).
151. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1174, 1201–1231, 1301–1330 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
See generally Geraldine Mund, Appointed or Anointed: Judges, Congress, and the Passage of
the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Part One: Outside Looking In, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (2007)
(analyzing the passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 as part of an extensive five-part
series by the same author).
152. Indeed, a number of scholars, including myself, have already put forward federal
legislative proposals seeking to harmonize the law surrounding labor and employment
disputes, in different contexts, as a way to promote uniformity and predictability in
the law. See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 115, at 91 (proposing uniform “law of termination”
that would simplify the governance of terminations); Alex B. Long, Employment
Retaliation and the Accident of Text, 90 OR. L. REV. 525 (2011) (proposing antiretaliation law that would apply to virtually all forms of employer retaliation); Paul M.
Secunda, Reflections on the Technicolor Right to Association in American Labor and
Employment Law, 96 KY. L.J. 343, 367 (2008) (“The proposed federal Freedom of
Association in the Workplace Act . . . would provide a complementary and comprehensive
statutory framework for all associational rights claims in the workplace.”).
153. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals was established in 1982. Since that time,
“[a] number of commentators have concluded that . . . the [Federal] Circuit has come to
embody a number of long-theorized problems with specialized courts, such as tendencies
toward interest-group capture, bias in favor of an overly muscular view of the laws under
its special care, and an esotericism or tunnel vision that disconnects the circuit from
broader social or legal concerns.” John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime
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Many advantages exist for a specialized labor and employment
appellate court. First would be the advantage of judicial familiarity and
expertise that an Article III labor and employment court system would
necessarily have in adjudicating solely labor and employment matters.
Second, judicial efficiency would be further enhanced because there
would be less dissonance between various federal appellate courts over
the meaning of controversial labor and employment laws.154
Such an appellate court would also benefit from the influence of
deliberation on culturally motivated cognition.155 An authority on labor
and employment law, Judge Harry T. Edwards, has commented in a
recent piece that “[i]n many such situations, a judge’s cultural cognition
can be moderated in anticipation of a colleague’s views—a kind of tacit
deliberation.”156 Indeed, deliberation as a cleansing and informationfiltering mechanism provides numerous opportunities to eliminate cognitive
illiberalism from appellate court decisionmaking:
Judges deliberate when they raise questions during oral argument to alert their
colleagues to their concerns. Judges deliberate in conference and continue to
deliberate after conference when they raise issues uncovered in their research.
Judges deliberate when they circulate draft opinions, receive their colleagues’
responses, and negotiate resolutions to any differences.157

In short, a good argument exists that an appellate court that specializes
in labor and employment law cases may provide the best opportunity for
fortifying labor and employment law theorizing from culturally motivated
cognition by requiring these judges to moderate their culturally motivated
cognition through deliberation with other judges.
However, the fact of the matter is that creating an appellate Article III
labor and employment court would face significant political hurdles in
Congress.158 One only needs to review the contentious history and the
Percolator”: A Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA
L. REV. 657, 659 (2009).
154. “[T]he central purpose [of the Federal Circuit’s creation was] to reduce the
widespread lack of uniformity and uncertainty of legal doctrine that exist[ed] in the
administration of patent law.” H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 23 (1981).
155. Edwards & Livermore, supra note 63, at 1964.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Indeed, one of the more difficult questions that would need to be answered is,
if there is need for a specialized labor and employment law appellate court, then why is
there not a need for specialized courts dealing with everything from real estate law to
products liability law? Furthermore, the District of Columbia Circuit Court already
plays this role to some degree because many of the appeals it receives come from federal
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considerable legislative effort required to create a separate Article I
bankruptcy court system.159 Nevertheless, and as argued in relation to
the creation of Article I employment courts based on the bankruptcy
court model, such a specialized court might have benefits concerning
uniformity and predictability in this area of the law that may sufficiently
outweigh any costs that opponents may see in further specializing the
federal courts.
4. British Employment Tribunal Model
The last model, and the most far-reaching one, would be to adopt a
system modeled on certain international court tribunals. The British
system offers a good point of reference because of some similarities in
the way that British and American law approach workplace legal disputes
as a theoretical matter.160
Under the British employment tribunal system, tribunals consist of a
chairperson, who is an experienced attorney, and two lay members appointed
from employer and employee representative groups respectively.161 The

administrative agencies like the NLRB. See Matthew Ginsburg, “A Nigh Endless Game
of Battledore and Shuttlecock”: The D.C. Circuit’s Misuse of Chenery Remands in
NLRB Cases, 86 NEB. L. REV. 595, 597 (2007) (“The D.C. Circuit, which is an alternate
venue for appeals under the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 . . . , routinely hears
more petitions for review of NLRB orders than any other circuit.”).
159. See generally Mund, supra note 151 (describing the creation of the current
bankruptcy court system). Of particular interest is the fact that Congress defeated
attempts to change Article I bankruptcy courts into Article III courts. See Judith Resnik
& Lane Dilg, Responding to a Democratic Deficit: Limiting the Powers and the Term of
the Chief Justice of the United States, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1575, 1611 (2006) (“When
considering what came to be known as the 1978 reforms, members of Congress
contemplated creating life-tenured judgeships for bankruptcy judges. The Judicial
Conference took a position against that proposition, and . . . Chief Justice [Burger] was a
very present lobbyist opposed to conferring Article III status on bankruptcy judges.”).
160. See Susan Harthill, Bullying in the Workplace: Lessons from the United
Kingdom, 17 MINN. J. INTL. L. 247, 267–68 (2008) (“The U.K. is a useful comparator for
the U.S. in [the workplace bullying] context because both countries lack a tradition of
basing harassment law on a dignity paradigm.”).
161. See id. at 270 (“[E]mployees may pursue their employment disputes through a
specialized Employment Tribunal.”); Jean R. Sternlight, In Search of the Best Procedure
for Enforcing Employment Discrimination Laws: A Comparative Analysis, 78 TUL. L.
REV. 1401, 1431–32 (2004) (“The idea of resolving discrimination claims through tribunals
can be traced to the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations,
better known as the Donovan Commission. This group suggested in 1968 that labor tribunals’
jurisdiction ‘should be defined so as to comprise all disputes arising between employers
and employees from their contracts of employment or from any statutory claims they
may have against each other in their capacity as employer and employee.’” (quoting ROYAL
COMMISSION ON TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYERS’ ASSOCIATIONS 1965–1968, REPORT,
1968, Cmnd. 3623, at 156 (U.K.))); Employment Tribunals: An Introduction, DIRECTGOV,
http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Employment/ResolvingWorkplaceDisputes/Employment
tribunals/DG_10028122 (last visited May 14, 2012).
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two lay members are not present at the hearing to represent either side in
a dispute and must maintain impartiality at all times.162 In addition, the
tribunal tries to match a lay member to the gender or to the race of the
claimant if the claim involves gender or race discrimination.163
As far as what the normal procedure is in the employment tribunals, a
claimant will file an application for a hearing.164 After the defendant
employer has been notified of the complaint, the parties to the dispute
proceed to mediation, which is administered by the Advisory Conciliation
and Arbitration Service (ACAS).165 During conciliation, an officer from
the ACAS will explain the procedures of the employment tribunal and
the points of law relevant to the claimant’s claim.166 Frequently,
disputes are resolved during the conciliation stage so that it effectively
acts as a filtering mechanism for reducing the number of claims that will
ultimately be decided by the tribunal.167
If mediation is unsuccessful, the tribunal will conduct a hearing,
which will typically last for a half day or less,168 though discrimination
cases may take two or three days.169 To facilitate the speedy adjudication of
disputes, the hearings are conducted informally and are not subject to the
normal rules of evidence that usually apply in British law courts.170

162. See Michael Mankes, Combatting Individual Employment Discrimination in
the United States and Great Britain: A Novel Remedial Approach, 16 COMP. LAB. L.J.
67, 89 (1994).
163. Sternlight, supra note 161, at 1433.
164. Mankes, supra note 162, at 90.
165. See Sternlight, supra note 161, at 1434–35; Martin Schneider, Employment
Litigation on the Rise? Comparing British Employment Tribunals and German Labor
Courts, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 261, 268–69 (2001).
166. Sternlight, supra note 161, at 1434.
167. Id. at 1435 (“According to the 2001–2002 ACAS Annual Report, 77.5% of
completed discrimination claims were either settled or withdrawn, as compared to just
22.5% that were resolved at the tribunal stage.” (citing ADVISORY, CONCILIATION AND
ARBITRATION SERV., ANNUAL REPORT 2001–2002: WORKING TOGETHER 26–27 tbl.8 (2002),
available at http://www.acas.org.uk/media/pdf/d/0/ACAS_02_AR_1.pdf)).
168. Mankes, supra note 162, at 92.
169. Sternlight, supra note 161, at 1434 & n.154 (citing EMPLOYMENT DEPARTMENT,
RESOLVING EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS DISPUTES: OPTIONS FOR REFORM, 1994, Cm. 2707, at
27 (U.K.)).
170. Mankes, supra note 162, at 92 (quoting LINDA DICKENS ET AL., DISMISSED:
A STUDY OF UNFAIR DISMISSAL AND THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL SYSTEM 194 (1985)); see
also Sternlight, supra note 161, at 1433 (“The proceeding before the [tribunal] is
adjudicative in nature, though it is intended to be less formal than a court proceeding.”);
Joseph M. Kelly & Bob Watt, Damages in Sex Harassment Cases: A Comparative Study
of American, Canadian, and British Law, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 79, 120
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Last, plaintiffs are limited to one of three remedies, (1) reinstatement to
their previous positions, (2) rehire by the same employer or an associated
employer, or (3) compensation, which does not include the possibility of
compensatory or punitive damages, but merely lost wages.171
Applications for review can be made to the employment tribunal
within fourteen days from the decision of the tribunal and the tribunal
may only grant a review in cases of error in the decision, errors in notice
to a party or parties, or other reasons warranting review.172 Appeals
against the decision of an employment tribunal can only be made on
matters of law to an Employment Appeals Tribunal, with further appeal
available to the Court of Appeals and the House of Lords.173
The British employment tribunal system was set up with the goal of
creating a system that was “easily accessible, informal, speedy and
inexpensive” so as to give employers and employees “the best possible
opportunity of arriving at an amicable settlement of their differences.”174
Because the tribunals are informal and are not bound by the rules of
evidence, plaintiffs do not face the same obstacles in pursuing claims
pro se as their American counterparts. Court fees are paid out of public
funds and litigants do not bear the prevailing party’s costs, unlike the
typical British rule that the losing party to a suit will pay the prevailing
party’s costs.175
One of the notable advantages of the British employment tribunal
model, aside from its accessibility, speed, and low cost for claimants and
employers, is that the members of the tribunal have significant experience
on employment matters.176 On the one hand, the lay members of the
tribunal provide impartial experience concerning the job involved or

(1996) (“[Employment] tribunals . . . are not courts of record and their decisions have no
precedential value.”).
171. Mankes, supra note 162, at 92. Although reinstatement is the preferred
remedy in unfair dismissal cases, compensation is the most common remedy granted.
See Schneider, supra note 165, at 278 (quoting Linda Dickens et al., Re-employment of
Unfairly Dismissed Workers: The Lost Remedy, 10 INDUS. L.J. 160, 161 (1981)). Indeed,
the proportion of reinstatements in successful unfair dismissal claims declined to the point
that the remedy was granted in less than one percent of cases in 1998 and 1999. Id.
(citing Emp’t Tribunals Serv., Employment Tribunal and Employment Appeal Tribunal
Statistics 1997–98 and 1998–99, 107 LABOUR MARKET TRENDS 493, 494 (1999) (U.K.)).
172. Mankes, supra note 162, at 92–93; Schneider, supra note 165, at 269 (“[P]arties
can apply to the tribunal for review of its decision, for example on the ground that new
evidence has come to light since the hearing.”).
173. Schneider, supra note 165, at 269.
174. Sternlight, supra note 161, at 1432 (quoting ROYAL COMMISSION ON TRADE UNIONS
AND EMPLOYERS’ ASSOCIATIONS 1965–1968, supra note 161, at 156).
175. Mankes, supra note 162, at 94.
176. See id. at 89.
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about the industry in which the job exists.177 On the other hand, the
chairperson is constantly exposed to labor and employment issues and
has the opportunity to develop sophisticated expertise on labor and
employment issues.178 Finally, this tripartite structure of the employment
tribunal panel also facilitates the legitimacy of the ultimate decision of
the tribunal.179
From a cognitive illiberalism perspective, the hope is that the
familiarity of the tribunal members with labor and employment law will
lead to less need to fall back on cultural values congenial to the legal
decisionmakers’ values and thereby avoid creating unnecessary discontent
with the law among “losers” in the process.180 Therefore, in addition to
promoting the British employment tribunal model’s goal of promoting
accessibility, efficiency, and economy,181 the British tribunal model also
represents a systemic solution to the problem of cognitive illiberalism
and the delegitimization of the law. With the tribunal’s three-person
panel and focus on employees and employers having a representative
present mirroring the claimaint’s and employer’s perspectives, the
tribunal consequently has a mechanism in place to ensure that each side
of a dispute is not delegitimized by the potentially culturally motivated
cognition of a sole decisionmaker.182
Put differently, the employment tribunal chairperson is well-positioned to
act as a judicial trimmer, as Sunstein contemplates, because he or she
must mediate between the poles represented by the two lay members of
the tribunal.183 What this means in the British tribunal model is that
decisions are more likely “to end up between the extremes, in a way that
makes both [employer and employees] believe that they have gained, or
not lost, something of importance.”184 Therefore, such decisions will

177. The purpose of including the two lay members is to bring “‘knowledge of human
nature and industrial practice,’ to communicate in plain words the complicated legal matter to
participants, and to enhance the perceived fairness of the hearing, thus ensuring acceptance
with the outcome of the case.” Schneider, supra note 165, at 275 (emphasis added) (quoting
DICKENS ET AL., supra note 170, at 59).
178. Id. at 274.
179. Id. at 274–76.
180. There will also be deliberation, as in appellate panels, which may also act to
counteract culturally motivated cognition. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
181. See Sternlight, supra note 161, at 1432.
182. Id.
183. See supra Part III.A.3.
184. See Sunstein, supra note 81, at 1054.
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also be more consistent with the ideals of humility and expressive
overdetermination.
Of course, the British model may also be subject to abuses that are all
too familiar in the United States. Indeed, many of the problems with
both current employment arbitration practice in the United States185 and
with the workers’ compensation model186 might make a British-type
employment tribunal model not ideal for those focused on workers
receiving a legitimate chance to vindicate their workplace rights in an
adjudicative setting. Nonetheless, its example should be taken seriously
by those who believe that some form of specialized tribunal is necessary
to fight against culturally motivated cognition in labor and employment
legal disputes in the United States.
IV. SPECIALIZED COURTS AND THE PROMISE OF OPACITY
Regardless of which institutional debiasing strategy is adopted, there
will be some disagreement over the relative advantages and disadvantages
of having specialized labor and employment law courts, tribunals, or
judges. The present Part undertakes a comparative institutional analysis,
considering the arguments in favor of such specialized institutions, the
arguments against such institutions, and finally, an argument based on
opacity that seeks to show that the American legal system should at least
experiment with some of these institutional debiasing strategies.
A. The Advantages of Specialization
Specialized judges and courts offer three recognized advantages, (1) a
reduction in the caseload for generalist judges, (2) an enhancement in the
quality of decisions by judges specialized in complex areas of the law,
and (3) a promotion of greater uniformity of decisions in courts specialized
185. Criticism of employment arbitration includes the fact that “[c]ompanies have
greater experience with, knowledge of, and resources for litigation; they are more lucid
about adjudication and better understand its rules and objectives.” Thomas E. Carbonneau,
Arguments in Favor of the Triumph of Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 395,
413 (2009). The repeat player problem that stems from these structural deficiencies might
lead to employers being unfairly advantaged in these settings. See infra notes 209–10
and accompanying text.
186. Although workers’ compensation laws provide ready access to remedies
for employee injuries in the workplace, such remedies are usually paltry. See Richard A.
Epstein, The Reflections and Responses of a Legal Contrarian, 44 TULSA L. REV. 647,
667 (2009) (describing the workers’ compensation model as involving “broad coverage
and lower damages”). Such administrative courts are also subject to criticism because of
the possibility of capture. Freeman L. Farrow, The Anti-Patient Psychology of Health
Courts: Prescriptions from a Lawyer-Physician, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 188, 201 (2010)
(“Specialized courts such as tax courts and workers compensation tribunals . . . have been
criticized as being subject to capture by repeat players who appear in the tribunals.”).
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in particularized areas of the law.187 As the case numbers mentioned
earlier suggest, generalist Article III judges have been inundated with an
increasing caseload while their judicial resources have not kept pace
with the increased demand on the federal judiciary.188 The expanded
jurisdiction of and reliance on magistrates is also an indicator of the need
for greater judicial resources for the federal courts.189
In addressing the case for enhanced decisionmaking by specialized
judges, the crux of the theory that judges in complex areas of law will
enhance the quality of decisions is that some areas of law, such as tax
law or patent law, are inherently difficult for nonspecialists to understand.
Thus, a specialist in the subject matter of the case will have a better
opportunity to understand and formulate the law as applied to the relevant
facts in a given case.190
Another perceived advantage of specialized courts is that specialization
will lead to greater uniformity of decisions.191 This does not necessarily
have to be done only through specialized judges but also can be done
through the utilization of experts, special masters, and technical advisors

187. Sarang Vijay Damle, Note, Specialize the Judge, Not the Court: A Lesson from
the German Constitutional Court, 91 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1268–69 (2005).
188. See supra notes 112–14 and accompanying text. Matters have been made
worse by recent political polarization, which has substantially delayed the confirmation
of federal judges in recent years. See RUSSELL WHEELER & SARAH A. BINDER, BROOKINGS
INST., DO JUDICIAL EMERGENCIES MATTER? NOMINATION AND CONFIRMATION DELAY
DURING THE 111TH CONGRESS 8–9 (Christine Jacobs ed., 2011), available at http://
www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2011/0216_judicial_emergencies_wheeler_binder
/0216_judicial_emergencies_wheeler_binder.pdf (“In sum—and recognizing individual
exceptions—the priority the Judicial Conference attaches to filling judicial emergencies
was not shared (at least with regards to the district courts) in 2009–2010 by the
administration in making nominations or by the Senate in confirming them (and probably
not by legislators in recommending nominees.)”).
189. See Victor Williams, A Constitutional Charge and a Comparative Vision To
Substantially Expand and Subject Matter Specialize the Federal Judiciary: A Preliminary
Blueprint for Remodeling Our National Houses of Justice and Establishing a Separate
System of Federal Criminal Courts, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 535, 542 (1996) (“Special
emphasis is given to the institutionalization of various judicial coping mechanisms that
ultimately shortchange justice, such as overreliance on staff attorneys, law clerks, and
magistrates.”).
190. Damle, supra note 187, at 1277.
191. See Joel C. Johnson, Lay Jurors in Patent Litigation: Reviving the Active,
Inquisitorial Model for Juror Participation, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 339, 355 (2004)
(“More important than the number of courts that numerous states have created is the fact
that the specialization has had the effect of making decisions more consistent and giving
the specialist judges more credibility.”).
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who can assist the judiciary.192 Increased caseloads compounded with
increased complexity in particular areas of the law, on the other hand,
can work to further multiply the problem of nonuniformity.193 In short,
the hope is that the use of specialized courts or judges will lead to greater
uniformity and predictability in this area of judicial decisionmaking over
time.
B. The Disadvantages of Specialization
Still, there are several points of concern for specialized courts. Among
those concerns, the most salient are (1) “judicial ‘tunnel vision,’” (2) the
risk of “judicial capture by special interests,” and (3) excessive judicial
bias rooted in familiarity with the subject matter.194
First, with regard to judicial tunnel vision, there is a risk that
specialized judges will lack the “‘cross-pollination’ of ideas” in the
common law and other areas of law.195 Furthermore, specialized judges
could make their specialized area of the law even more complex,
rendering it even less intelligible to a generalist judge or attorney.196
The risk of judicial capture is also an important concern.197 Because
of the more narrowly defined area of law on which specialized judges
would necessarily be focused, the risk of capture is more accentuated
due to the more narrowly defined group of interests that those judges’
decisions would potentially affect.198 On the other hand, the perceived
advantage of a generalist judge is that a judge will hear cases affecting a
wider range of competing interest groups, thus reducing the risk of capture.
Finally, of particular concern is that the increased familiarity of judges
with a particular area of law may exacerbate the problem of judicial bias:

192. See LeRoy L. Kondo, Untangling the Tangled Web: Federal Court Reform
Through Specialization for Internet Law and Other High Technology Cases, 6 UCLA
J.L. & TECH. 1, 25–28 (2002) (discussing the benefits of having the Board of Patent Appeals
& Interfaces of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office operate as an Article I tribunal).
193. Damle, supra note 187, at 1277–78.
194. Id. at 1269.
195. Id. at 1281. Though this seems like it would be less of a concern in an area
like employment law, where much of the law is based on the common law of contracts
and torts. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW ch. 2, 4 (Tentative Draft No.
2, 2009).
196. Damle, supra note 187, at 1281.
197. Id. at 1283.
198. See Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement:
Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81, 130–31 (2002) (“As
th[e] imbalance of participation increases, so does the risk of capture.”).
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[W]hile the expertise that courts of limited jurisdiction provide is undoubtedly
valuable, the flip side is that specialist judges might have too much familiarity
with a particular area of the law. Judges who are experts in welfare law,
for example, are much more likely to have particular views about the proper
operation of welfare law and hence are much more likely than generalist
judges to impose their own views of policy.199

Further compounding the problem from a cultural cognition standpoint is
how a narrow group of specialized judges may be even more inclined to
engage in cultural bias due to the community of interest that may form
among a smaller cadre of employment judges.200 And it is not simply
about getting a decision or two “wrong”; it is also the problem of this
smaller group of judges incorrectly predicting how others will see a
decision and then being aggressively overconfident in defending the
choice. This is the overconfidence associated with the phenomenon of
aporia.201
Two other concerns about specialized courts also deserve mention.
First, federal courts of general jurisdiction are much better suited to
adapting to the changing volume of cases in different areas of the law.202
From year to year, and in different areas of the law, there is
unpredictability in the volume of cases. 203 Therefore, developing a
specialized court system would entail ascertaining a predicted volume
of cases to justify an allocation of federal resources to procuring staff to
meet those volume demands.
Any mismatches in the allocation of judicial resources for specialized
courts with volume demands for the expertise of a specialized system
would either weaken the case for specialization—as in the case of allocating
greater resources than demand requires—or strengthen the need for the
courts—as in the case of allocating fewer resources than demand requires.
Generalist judges, however, obviate the need to accurately predict volume
for particular areas of the law because the focus is on the allocation of
enough judicial resources to meet the overall caseload, regardless of the
substantive area of law of each individual case.
199. Damle, supra note 187, at 1283.
200. See id. Kahan notes that “[i]ndividuals generally conform their beliefs to those
held by their associates—both because those are the persons from whom they obtain most of
their information and because those are the ones whose respect they most desire.”
Kahan, supra note 47, at 120–21. Consequently, specialized judges may be encouraged
to conform their beliefs to accord with those held by their narrowly specialized group.
201. See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text.
202. Damle, supra note 187, at 1284–85.
203. See supra notes 112–14.

409

Second, there may be concern that a specialized federal court, with its
focus on a narrow area of law, may not be able to attract highly qualified
individuals to fill these specialist judicial roles. Specialized courts have
been traditionally viewed “by the bar and the public as ‘inferior,’
regardless of their place on a judicial organization chart.”204 Because of
this perception of specialized courts as inferior in stature among the bar
and public, these courts may have more trouble attracting highly
qualified individuals to serve as judges, potentially affecting the quality
of decisions.205
Though the point of this subpart is not to diminish the case for creating a
system within the federal judiciary to develop a cadre of specialized
employment judges by pointing out the potential criticisms and pitfalls
that specialized courts may have, these concerns are highlighted here so
that they can be addressed if such a model were adopted. By recognizing
the potential drawbacks of specialized courts, many of these concerns
can be addressed through systemic solutions while also addressing the
overarching issue of cognitive illiberal bias in employment-related cases.
Furthermore, the potential shortcomings of specialized judges in the
employment law area must be balanced against the advantages specialization
can offer: increased uniformity, enhanced decisional quality, greater systemic
efficiency, and decisions free from culturally motivated cognition and
the associated societal problems of cognitive illiberalism.
C. The Promise of Opacity
The problem of capture discussed as one of the disadvantages of
having specialized judges or courts is certainly an issue with any judicial
selection process. This phenomenon arises in various contexts including
in situations where a federal judge may be predisposed to deciding cases
in ideological conformity with his or her party affiliation.206 The

204. See Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 745,
748 (1981). Since the Jordan article was written, however, many have come to believe
that the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has become the preeminent intellectual property
court in the country. See Nicole-Marie Slayton, Internet Business Model Patents: An Obvious
Incentive To Reform the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 21 LOY. L.A. ENT.
L. REV. 123, 130 n.82 (2000) (noting the preeminence of the Federal Circuit in the patent
field).
205. See Damle, supra note 187, at 1285. With the bankruptcy courts, for instance,
it is notable that only a few judges who started on the bankruptcy courts have ended up
being elevated to Article III courts. See McKenzie, supra note 141, at 796 (“Of the 115
bankruptcy judges who left the bench between 1995 and 2004, only 8 did so due to
elevation to the Article III bench.” (citing Ralph R. Mabey, The Evolving Bankruptcy
Bench: How Are the “Units” Faring?, 47 B.C. L. REV. 105, 107 (2005))).
206. See David Fontana & Donald Braman, Judicial Backlash or Just Backlash?
Evidence from a National Experiment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript
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concern about capture becomes more heightened when a judge only
works with cases in a particular field of law, and a potential exists that
parties affected by these decisions will seek to influence these specialized
judges to decide in their favor.207
Capture may become even easier when a specialized judge only deals
with one type of case.208 Thus, employer or pro-union groups may be
encouraged to curry favor with judges specialized in labor and employment
law. Indeed, there is a similar issue in nonunion employment arbitration,
as is seen with the “repeat player problem.”209 Because arbitrators are
selected by the parties and employers are more often called to arbitrate
employment disputes, there is a fear that arbitrators will seek to curry
favor with those employers because that is the likely source of their
future business.210
Another concern for specialized judges in the area of capture is that
they are perceived to not have the same degree of judicial independence
as their Article III counterparts because they do not have life tenure with
salary protection.211 However, as discussed above, the selection process
of these judges may provide its own protection for this judicial class, if

at 45), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id =1942282 (“Individuals
are nominated to the Court because they are committed to the cultural perspective
behind the agenda of the nominating President on salient issues, and the President nominates
individuals like this to satisfy core members of his own political party.” (citing Geoffrey R.
Stone, Understanding Supreme Court Confirmations, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 381, 450)).
207. See McKenzie, supra note 141, at 798–800; see also Damle, supra note 187, at
1283.
208. Damle, supra note 187, at 1283.
209. See Carbonneau, supra note 185, at 413.
210. Id. (“Not only are the corporations more aware of, and familiar with, the arbitral
process, but the process and its agents are more familiar with them. This circumstance
could breed either an underlying contempt or a procedural or psychological advantage.”);
see also Alexander J. S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case
Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2011) (“[R]esults [of a
comprehensive empirical study] provide strong evidence of a repeat employer effect in
which employee win rates and award amounts are significantly lower where the employer
is involved in multiple arbitration cases . . . .”); David Sherwyn et. al, In Defense of
Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath
Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 143
(1999) (“[W]e must note that the concept of repeat player bias is tenuous. . . . Despite
the fact that the concept is illogical, Professor Bingham’s research supports the hypothesis
that the repeat player bias does have an effect on arbitration results.” (citing Lisa B.
Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y
J. 189 (1997))).
211. See McKenzie, supra note 141, at 750–51.
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the process for selecting bankruptcy judges in the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals provides an indication of how a process might work.212
For example, the selection of magistrate judges and bankruptcy judges
by Article III judges from within the federal judiciary, hidden to a
substantial degree from public comment, provides the protection of opacity
to the Article I judiciary.213 Rafael Pardo explains this counterintuitive
outcome by describing how “process transparency may reduce the utility
of a candidate transparency requirement and thus undermine judicial
quality” while on the other hand “process opacity may prevent candidate
transparency from being co-opted for political ends, thus improving
judicial quality.”214
The primary controls available for ensuring judicial accountability are
screening through either the appointment process of the Article III
judiciary or the merit-screening process from within the federal judiciary
for Article I judges. 215 The secondary controls are the processes for
censure, reprimand, suspension, and finally removal or reappointment if
the Article I judge acts in a way beyond the realm of reasonable behavior.216
Pardo separates these two functions as the “ex ante accountability
mechanism” and the “ex post accountability mechanism.”217
The most familiar ex ante accountability mechanism for judges is the
appointment of Supreme Court Justices where candidates articulate their
judicial philosophy on a variety of issues including judicial approach, the
role of the courts, and the state of the law.218 The ex ante method seeks
212. See supra notes 134–39 and accompanying text.
213. See Rafael I. Pardo, The Utility of Opacity in Judicial Selection, 64 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 633 (2009). The term opacity is used by Pardo to describe candidate
selection processes that are closed in nature, or opaque, in contrast to transparent selection
processes that are open to the public. Id. at 633. Pardo utilizes the selection process of
bankruptcy judges to illustrate how the opaque selection process facilitates the selection
of highly qualified candidates that are freer from political bias than those judges selected
to the Article III bench. See id.
214. Id.
215. See id. at 635–36; see also Jonathan Remy Nash, Prejudging Judges, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 2168, 2172 (2006) (explaining that the judicial selection process can be used to
hold “judges directly accountable”).
216. Pardo, supra note 213, at 635–36 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 354(a)(2)(A), 631(e)
(2000); id. § 152(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. V 2005)); see also Emily Field Van Tassel, Resignations
and Removals: A History of Federal Judicial Service—and Disservice—1789–1992, 142
U. PA. L. REV. 333, 335 (1993) (describing the removal process for Article III judges).
217. See Pardo, supra note 213, at 635–36.
218. Of course, given recent troubles in confirming all levels of federal court judges,
see supra note 188, this process may not be the best one to emulate. There is also the
concern that nominees try to avoid saying anything of substance in the confirmation
process. See David Weigel, The Judges Who Didn’t Make It, SLATE.COM (Dec. 23, 2010,
8:21 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/blogs/weigel/archive/2010/12/23/the-judges-who-didnt-make-it.aspx (“Most future judicial nominees have learned the lesson that the young Barack
Obama learned in the 1990s—don’t say anything interesting about the law.”).
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a precommitment from the candidate regarding the manner in which he or she
would carry out the duties of office . . . . If the selecting group places a great
deal of emphasis on the candidate’s answers as a selection qualification, and if the
group is particularly adept at identifying candidates who will adhere postselection to
what they have said during the selection process, then the process will function
as an accountability mechanism prior to the judge taking office.219

However, the difficulty of the ex ante approach is that the longer a
judge’s term is, the opportunity for accountability becomes even less
frequent.220 For specialized employment judges, the importance of the
ex ante accountability mechanism is not as substantial precisely because
of their limited-tenure status and the lack of public interest in such judicial
selection.221 Furthermore, there is a recurring ex post accountability
mechanism for these judges who must, if they wish to be reappointed,
adhere to the standards of review for selection to a new term.222
By allowing for a degree of opacity in the selection process of
candidates for specialized employment positions, courts, or tribunals, the
political pressure placed upon individuals serving on selection committees
to please narrow constituent groups may be mitigated.223 And because
the decision to select a bankruptcy or magistrate judge is ultimately
made by a life-tenured Article III judge, decisionmakers are free to make
decisions, ignoring the appeals of narrow constituent groups, on the
basis of the candidate’s professional merits rather than on whether the
candidate’s political affiliations match the decisionmaker’s political
wishes.
The hope is that insulation of specialized judges from groups to whom
they have a natural cultural affinity will make it more likely that these
judges will produce “trimmed” legal decisions that permit self-affirmation

219. Pardo, supra note 213, at 635; see also Fontana & Braman, supra note 206
(manuscript at 45) (describing the ex ante vetting process for Supreme Court Justices).
220. Pardo, supra note 213, at 636–37 (“[T]he more structural independence a judge’s
term of office provides, the more important it becomes for an ex ante accountability
mechanism to play a role in the judicial quality function.”). In this regard, consider
Justices who were appointed by Republican Presidents to the United States Supreme Court
who later became quite progressive in their judicial philosophies—Justices Brennan,
Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter. See, e.g., Lisa Keen, Justice Stevens: A Republican Who
Grew Liberal with the Times, GA V OICE (Apr. 15, 2010, 11:16 PM), http://www.the
gavoice.com/index.php/news/national-news-menu/177-justice-stevens-a-republican-who-grewliberal-with-the-times.
221. Magistrate judges serve for terms of eight years while bankruptcy judges serve
fourteen-year terms. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 152(a)(1), 631(e) (2006).
222. See id. § 152(a)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 631(a)–(b) (2006).
223. See Pardo, supra note 213, at 635.
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for those who are disfavored in a given case. Moreover, such decisions
will be more legitimate to most citizens because the larger community
will be assured “that those decisionmakers’ findings are genuinely untainted
by cultural partisanship.”224 Finally, opacity in judicial selection of these
judges may provide a crucial counterweight, in addition to the expertise
of these specialized judges, against legal decisionmaking tainted by
cultural bias.
V. CONCLUSION
The object of this Article has been to focus attention on the danger
that cognitive illiberalism poses to legal decisionmaking in general and
to the polarized field of American labor and employment law in
particular. It has attempted to illustrate how legal decisionmakers are
vulnerable to betraying their commitments to neutrality by unconsciously
fitting their view of the legally consequential facts of a case in a manner
that is congenial to their values. Cognitive illiberalism subsequently
results from how legal decisionmakers explain their decisions and how
those explanations are processed by “losers” in the politico-legal wars of
our society. Infected by cognitive illiberalism, law becomes delegitimized
as perceived by the larger community.
To address this threat to the ideal of neutrality in judicial
decisionmaking,225 this Article has advanced a spectrum of debiasing
strategies to provide an analytical toolbox for legislators and others
policymakers to consider in bolstering the legitimacy of the law. For the
first time, institutional debiasing strategies have been advanced as an
additional method to minimize societal conflict over labor and
employment law decisions.
The hope is that these proposed institutional structures will minimize
the amount of needless discontent with American labor and employment
law, bring greater uniformity, clarity, and predictability to these legal
decisions, and encourage the development of a professionalized group of
labor and employment law judges. At the very least, such institutional
experimentation would improve the public discourse on vital workplace
issues in the United States.

224. Kahan et al., supra note 2 (manuscript at 36).
225. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there
is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”); Kahan, supra
note 23, at 6 (“The most fundamental form of individual freedom that liberal constitutionalism
secures for its citizens depends on the promise that government won’t impose
legal obligations that presuppose adherence to a moral or political orthodoxy.”).
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